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Summary. Despite the increasing diffusion of the Internet technology, TV remains
the principal medium of communication. People’s perceptions, knowledge, beliefs
and opinions about matter of facts get (in)formed through the information reported
on by the mass-media.
However, a single source of information (and consensus) could be a potential
cause of anomalies in the structure and evolution of a society.
Hence, as the information available (and the way it is reported) is fundamental
for our perceptions and opinions, the definition of conditions allowing for a good
information to be disseminated is a pressing challenge. In this paper starting from
a report on the last Italian political campaign in 2008, we derive a socio-cognitive
computational model of opinion dynamics where agents get informed by different
sources of information. Then, a what-if analysis, performed trough simulations on the
model’s parameters space, is shown. In particular, the scenario implemented includes
three main streams of information acquisition, differing in both the contents and
the perceived reliability of the messages spread. Agents’ internal opinion is updated
either by accessing one of the information sources, namely media and experts, or
by exchanging information with one another. They are also endowed with cognitive
mechanisms to accept, reject or partially consider the acquired information.
Key words: opinion dynamics; social influence; gossip; media; agenda-setting
1.1 Introduction
Despite the increasing diffusion of the Internet technology, traditional media
– e.g., news papers and TV - remain the principal instruments for the infor-
mation diffusion. People’s perceptions, knowledge, beliefs and opinions about
the world and its evolution, get (in)formed and modulated through the in-
formation reported on by the mass-media. An unbalanced distribution of the
power on this basin of information (and consensus) could lead to anomalies
in the structure and the evolution of society. In this paper we focus upon a)
the possible effects that an anomalous distribution (and use) of the mediatic
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power could potentially bear on the public opinion b) the conditions allowing
for a good dissemination of the information.
Since the early thirties ([36, 2]) the informal study of social influence has
produced abundant evidence of structural factors affecting people’s beliefs. In
social life, agents are exposed to different communication systems interacting
with one another, ranging from one-to-many information transmission typical
of traditional broadcasting media, to one-to-one systems characterizing the
new media, but including several intermediate modalities. How do they inter-
act? Which one is most likely to exercise the strongest influence on agents’
opinions? Despite the importance social scientists attribute to the role of per-
suasive communication (think of the Hovland school of persuasion), different
communication systems have rarely been compared under natural conditions,
and even less in artificial experiments. Based on social impact theory ([23]) re-
cent simulation-based studies of opinion dynamics [37, 19, 22, 7, 16, 4, 26, 31]
observe how numerically defined opinions spread and aggregate over a given
population as a function of the distance among the values agents assign to
them. Within these studies, however, the process of communication among
the agents is not explicitly addressed. Plunged into the same network, agents
are assumed to exchange opinions as a function of the distance between them:
the lower this is, the more the agents are inclined to converge. In this paper,
the role of different forms of communication in opinion dynamics is addressed
with the help of agent based simulation.
The design of the computational model has been derived by a survey re-
porting on the relationship between information delivered by the media and
the social perceptions’ dynamics during the Italian political campaign in 2008.
In our model, opinions are numerically defined on one parameter that stands
for the certainty with which agents hold them; as in the bounded confidence
model ([9]), agents are assumed to exchange their opinions based on the dis-
tance between them. However, we introduced three modifications over the
preceding works on opinion dynamics: agents (a) share two relatively indepen-
dent opinions, (b) are exposed to different forms of communication, namely
one-to-many and one-to-one, which will be characterized later on in the paper
on a number of dimensions, and (c) receive inputs from two distinct sources
of information, expert and non-expert.
The former modification is suggested by the necessity to make the scenario
more realistic. The latter modifications instead are needed to address a topical
question. It is a common opinion nowadays that the new media play a positive
role in the control and improvement of the quality of information circulating
in a system. To what extent is this opinion backed up by existing evidence?
Comparing the effects of peer-to-peer communication Vs traditional media on
the diffusion of opinions and observing their interaction, we aim to investigate
whether the former system is bound to amplify the effects of the latter, or can
exercise a relatively independent influence on information quality. To clearly
distinguish the effects of the two systems, we have introduced the distinc-
tion between the expert and the non-expert source. To what extent will the
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experts affect existing opinions? How much expert-driven information must
be accessed through the new media for the average quality of information
circulating in the population to increase?
1.2 Grounding the model
1.2.1 Media in the Italian Case
Due the abstract and complex nature of the phenomenon, capturing the in-
terplay between information delivered by the media and their effects on social
perceptions in a consistent socio-cognitive computational model is absolutely
not trivial. The theory of agenda-setting presented in [21] shows that the fre-
quency of information delivered by the media correlated positively with its
consequent perceived importance. The issues reported on by central media
are the most debated and are perceived as priorities to be solved by policy-
makers. Hence, by “bombing” the audience with the same news the media
could potentially impact and modify the public opinion. (Un)Fortunately
the actual Italian scenario provides a very “luxurious” real context to analyze
such a sophisticated matter in depth. In the following we show charts from
a survey named ”Security in Italy: Meanings, Image and Reality” ([11]) per-
formed during the last Italian political campaign (2008). Such a survey shows
that the quality of the reported information is often lower than desirable. This
should not come as a surprise, if we compare the communication from central
media to market asymmetry [1]. Under asymmetry, information, as any other
product, is bound to become a lemon, i.e. a corrupted and useless good.
Figure 1.1 shows the number of news regarding common crimes during four
years comparing the news reported on respectively by private (in black) and
by public national networks (in red). Notice that the highest peaks of both
curves coincide with the political campaign period. Figure 1.2 shows the real
number of crimes (in black), the media reports on security matters (in red),
and the shared social perceptions of the sample investigated within the survey
(in green). The media reports about security are shown to be almost perfectly
complementary to the real trend of crimes, as provided by the Ministry of
Domestic Affairs. As figures show, both networks - the private more than
the public - injected informational lemons into society during the last Italian
campaign. The person holding the private network (and indirectly controlling
a part of the public network service) and the candidate proposing security as
the principal Italian problem, coincide. He won the election. Which kind of
role has been played by such a strategy of communication, supported by the
media reports, on the public agenda and on the elections’ results?
1.2.2 Within Different Communication Paradigms
Information is acquired both through communication among agents and from
the centralized media. One-to-one and one-to-many communication have been
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Fig. 1.1. The trend of news related to common crimes delivered by the private
(black) and public (red) networks
Fig. 1.2. The trend of the news reported on by media about common crimes in red,
the trend of social perception about crimes in green, and the real trend of common
crimes in black
compared by marketing scientists ([10]) as well as cultural evolutionary scien-
tists ([8]), and shown to have different although balanced effects. As reported
in [25], according to classic communication models (see [15]), peer to peer
(P2P) communication is a step-wise, asynchronous process that requires a
more or less lengthy temporal extension: it starts at one point in time and
takes effect after a certain amount of steps, and in each of them it is iter-
ated. On the contrary, centralized or broadcast communication takes place at
once. Whereas broadcast communication is a one-to-many process ([14]), P2P
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communication reaches a smaller audience. As summarized in Table 1.2.2,
two complementary patterns of properties emerge. Each pattern allows dif-
ferent expected performances. P2P systems are less efficient and more liable
to corruption, although more interactive and controllable. P2P can either be
proactive or reactive, whilst broadcast (BC) communication generally is only
proactive. The former is based upon and aimed at reciprocating information,
whereas broadcast communication can hardly be expected to be reciprocated
(it is often institutional). P2P is spontaneous and based upon acquaintance-
ship or familiarity networks, while BC communication, which is based upon
other types of networks, is often facilitated or allowed by the sharing of new
technologies.
Which further consequences can we expect from either system? How deep
is their respective influence on the population? How do they interact, when
insisting on the same population? Are they interdependent, or is there a dom-
inance of one system on the other, and if so, which one is more influential?
Finally, what is the effect of their interaction on information quality?
Peer-to-Peer Communication (P2P) Broadcast Communication (BC)
one to one/few one to many
asynchronous synchronous
step wise at once
sensitive to temporal extention not affected by temporal extention
interactive proactive
based upon reciprocation no reciprocation
based upon familiarity networks not affected by the network topology
1.3 Context
1.3.1 Related Works
The effect of communication on opinion formation has been addressed by dif-
ferent disciplines from within the social and the computational sciences, as
well as the complexity science. Social scientists focus on polarization, i.e. the
concentration of opinions by means of interaction, as one main effect of the
”social influence” [12]. Social psychology offers an extensive literature on atti-
tude change models, as reviewed by [20]. Most influential in social psychology
is the “The Social Impact Theory” [24], according to which the amount of in-
fluence depends on the distance, number, and strength (i.e., persuasiveness) of
influence sources. As stated in ([7]), an important variable, poorly controlled
in current studies, is structure topology. Interactions are invariably assumed
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as either all-to-all or based on a spatial regular location (lattice), while more
realistic scenarios are ignored. The most popular model applied to the aggre-
gation of opinions is the bounded confidence model, presented in [9]. Much
like previous studies ([17, 13]), in this paper agents exchanging information
are modeled as likely to adjust their opinions only if the preceding and the
received information are close enough to each other. Such an aspect is mod-
eled by introducing a real number , which stands for tolerance or uncertainty
([7]) such that an agent with an opinion x interacts only with agents whose
opinions is in the interval ]x− , x+ [. In our previous works [29], [30], [32],
[18] and [25] we investigated the role of communication systems on agents’
perceptions, by means of multi-agent based simulations, when informational
cheating occurs.
The model we present in this paper, which preliminary results have been
introduced in [33, 28], extends the bounded confidence model by providing
agents with two, instead of one, conflicting and independent values represent-
ing their opinions about, say, welfare and security. Furthermore, in our model
agents resort to two additional sources of information, external to the social
network, aimed at representing experts and media.
1.3.2 Research Questions
In our previous work [33] the focus was on the interplay between institutional
broadcasting and P2P communication.
The correlation within the frequency of information delivered by the media
and their consequent effects on social perceptions, namely agenda-setting, has
been theorized in 1972 by McCombs et al. With the advent of the Internet new
and indipendent sources of information are available to users. Furthermore,
an individual on the Internet can select the sources which is closer to his/her
vision about matter of facts or having direct access to experts. In this paper,
we will assume that, when accessing Internet, the agents are quite confident
in the truth-value of the acquired information. Of course, this assumption is
somewhat arbitrary, but what matters here is the source of influence rather
than the way it is found out.
In our model, agents are exposed to a) the conventional media, repeat-
ing the same message at each time step, b) the new media, and c) to the
information circulating within the neighborhood.
Hence, the follow-up research questions addressed within the present work:
(a) what would happen to agents’ opinions if both conventional and new media
were confronted with an additional P2P-based source of information highly
trusted by the agents? (b) Which is the role of the white-zone, namely the
percentage of agents that are reached neither by media nor on the Internet?
Furthermore, how many experts are needed in a network to reduce the infor-
mation asymmetry between agents and conventional media, or, to put it more
explicitly, how many experts are needed to contrast possible informational
cheating spread within the system? (d) How does the interaction topology,
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i.e. the network structure, affect the information diffusion and the dynam-
ics of opinions? In this paper we address the former three sets of questions,
leaving the last one for future works.
1.4 Preliminaries
In the simulated system, traditional media send out messages in broadcasting
to a variable percentage of the population, while members communicate with
neighbors and are thus exposed to an additional source of information which
they consider highly reliable, the experts.
In this section the basic definition related with our model and the simula-
tion results are provided.
1.4.1 The Interaction Topology
In order to design a realistic model our agents are plunged in a network incor-
porating real world networks’ properties. Real world networks are scale-free,
in the sense that their node degree distributions follow a power-law that is not
affected by the size of the network. Let N be a connected graph in which each
node v has a number of k originating links following a power law distribution
P (k) ∼ k−y. We generate a scale free network by progressively adding nodes
on a previously existing network and then introducing links to the existing
nodes following the so called “preferential attachment” mechanism [3]. The
construction strategy of the algorithm aims at maintaining the link probabil-
ity between any couple of nodes proportional to the number of existing links
ki already connected to the selected node.
1.4.2 The General Bounded Confidence
As mentioned above, the most famous model of opinion dynamics based upon
bounded confidence is the one developed by Deffuant et al. in [9]. The model
can be explained as an asynchronous game in a distributed environment where
the nodes v of the network N , i.e., the agents, interact by exchanging their
opinions. For instance, consider the iterative process over N , where each el-
ement v ∈ N updates its internal state at each time step by comparing its
opinion with the information circulating in the neighborhood. From a theo-
retical point of view, this model presents a number of oversimplifications. In
particular, it assumes that low distance is the only determinant of opinion up-
date. Other aspects, for example, (a) the degree of certainty on one’s opinion
and (b) the extent to which it is shared by others are ignored. The second as-
pect will be addressed in future works. For the time being, we limit ourselves
to extend the original model to a slightly more complex situation in which
agents have a generic subjective disposition to accept others’ beliefs, and hold
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two independent opinions. Hence, given two agents x and y exchanging their
opinions v(x) and v(y) the entities’ internal states are updated by applying
the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 (BCM) Bounded confidence model
if | v(x)− v(y)| ≤ t then
v(x)← v(x) + m(v(y)− v(x))
Where m is a constant that can be fixed by the user within the interval
(0..0.5]. It represents the convergence parameter - e.g., a way to increase the
convergence by dividing the distance d = v(x) − v(y) between two agents’
opinions in 1m steps. The variable t represents agents’ tolerance, a threshold
defining the limit under which an opinion can be accepted by an agent.
1.5 The Model
Our model extends the model of Deffuant et al. by defining agents beliefs on
two conflicting values measuring respectively the welfare and security desire.
In addition, as shown in Figure 1.3 in our model agents get informed by
accessing two different additional sources of information, namely experts and
media.
Fig. 1.3. The Communication Model
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We refer to agents accessing the former source as wise agents, while agents
accessing the latter are called televiewers. In general, to process information,
agents apply the bounded confidence; on the contrary, a wise agent is more
inclined to accept the information acquired by the experts.
1.5.1 Entities of the Model
In this section the agents protocol and their interactions will be introduced.
Media.
Conventional media is simulated as a special agency, reporting the same mes-
sage at each simulation turn to a subset of the agents’ set V .
The media agent m ∈M is not linked to the network and has the goal to
persuade the audience that security is a matter more important than welfare.
The media’s reported message is denoted by the following set:
{ml,mr, V1 | 0 ≤ ml ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ mr ≤ 1, V1 ⊂ V } (1.1)
where ml,mr represent the media reported values of events respectively
related to welfare and security issues.
Interacting Peers.
The audience is composed by agents (i.e. the network nodes), whose shared
goal is to exchange information with other agents in one’s neighborhood. They
also receive messages from the media and from the wise agents.
When interacting with one another, agents v ∈ V are provided with an
internal state defined as follows:
{vl, vr | 0 ≤ vl ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ vr ≤ 1} (1.2)
respectively representing agents’ beliefs about welfare and security issues.
The closer vl and vr values are to 1, the more each debated issue (i.e. welfare
and security) is considered to be important by the agent. The agents’ inter-
nal state, in the protocol, corresponds to the message sent as an answer to
each external request of information coming from its neighbours. The initial
configuration of agents’ opinions is set up according to a uniform random
distribution of both values (i.e. security and welfare desire).
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Wiseagents and Televiewers.
The set of agents V is composed by two kinds of agents, each subpopulation is
denoted by the source of information accessed. Agents accessing experts will be
called WiseAgents (WAs), those exposed to media will be called TeleViewers
(TVs).
WiseAgents and TeleViewers differ in the way they process the information
acquired. The former are highly confident in its truth value while the latter
process the media information as the information they receive from peers, i.e.
by applying the bounded confidence model mechanism.
1.5.2 The Model Interaction
Media and Peers.
Agents acquire information from media agencies according to a passive proto-
col, by acquiring the values they send and comparing them with their previous
opinions. Information is either accepted or not, based on the bounded confi-
dence mechanism ([9]). The agent’s opinions vl, vr and the information from
the media mld,mrd are transformed in two new agent’s opinions. The function
generates two new values for vl, vr. The variable t ∈ R stands for peer agents’
tolerance, i.e., the subjective disposition to accept others’ information. The
two guard variables gl and gr are calculated by the Boolean expression return-
ing true if the difference between acquired and owned information is below
the tolerance threshold t. The guard variables gl and gr respectively control
the access to the updated values of vl and vr, which is implemented on two
independent opinion spaces. The values of vl and vr are updated through the
following:
vl = (vl + (mld(vl −mld))
vr = (vr +mrd(vr −mrd))
Among Interacting Peers.
Agents exchange information by comparing their preferences. This interaction
is executed after both TeleViewers and WiseAgents receive the information
by their respective sources.
Each agent communicates with the set of neighbours within a distance set
to 1. We will follow [9]’ convention, according to which, when communication
occurs between any two agents, these mix their opinions when the differences
is smaller than the threshold t.
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1.6 Experiments
The experiments design has been performed with the main aim to perform
a what-if analysis, based upon simulations, of the effect of information and
communication on social perceptions.
We focus on the effect of two different sources of information, reporting
different (and complementary) messages to the audience, on the agents’ opin-
ions trend. In particular we stress the polarization of opinions toward one of
the two main debated issues, which in the model corresponds to security and
welfare. The main goal of the media is to persuade the audience that secu-
rity is more important than welfare (reporting the same message respectively
fixed to 8 for security and 3 for welfare). On the contrary, agents resorting to
experts (giving respectively 3 for security and 8 for welfare) consider welfare
more urgent than security. In addition, experts and media differ as to the way
their information is trusted by the agents. On the one hand, Wise Agents
accept the information provided by the experts without applying the proviso
of the bounded confidence model, meaning that the information is assumed as
truthful. On the other hand, TeleViewers, when acquiring information from
the media, adjust their beliefs according to the bounded confidence model.
1.6.1 Scenario 1: Gossiping Peers
In the first set of experiments, intended to provide the scenario with the
baseline settings, we explore P2P communication mechanisms according to
the bounded confidence model ([9]), by varying the value of tolerance, i.e.
the subjective disposition of agents to accept the information received, in-
dependent of the source. The baseline experimental settings implement nine
scenarios, with the number of agents set to 100, without media broadcasting
and for increasing levels of tolerance (from 0.1 to 0.9 at step 0.1) for 100 sim-
ulation turns. In order to cope with the computer pseudo randomisation, the
simulation is performed ten times per each scenario, and the results are then
averaged.
Emerging Results
The effect of peer-to-peer communication on opinion dynamics is shown in
Figure 1.4, where both welfare and security opinions for increasing levels of
tolerance are shown. Both opinions (welfare and security) are set up randomly
within the interval ]0, 1[ at the beginning of each simulation. As shown in
Figure 1.4 the trend of both opinions fluctuates around the average value
of the initial distribution, meaning that, over a scale free network, the P2P
communication leads to a flat distribution of both opinions about security and
welfare urgency.
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Fig. 1.4. Interacting peers opinion dyamics for increasing level of tolerance
1.6.2 Scenario 2: Adding the Media
The second battery of experiments addresses the question what is the com-
bined effect of the two complementary communications systems: how do they
interact? In particular, does P2P communication amplify or inhibit the effect
of media? The parameters space has been explored for increasing numbers of
agents reached by the media broadcasting (from 0% to 100% with an incre-
mental step of 10%) and for increasing values of tolerance (from 0.1 to 0.9
with step 0.1). For each simulation ten runs were performed.
Emerging Results
Fig. 1.5. The effect of media message on Opinion Dyanmics for increasing levels of
Tolerance (0.3,0.5,0.8)
Opinion dynamics is based upon and mediated according to the the
bounded confidence convention. The experimental results are presented for
increasing levels of tolerance at different levels of media broadcasting.
Figure 1.5 shows the different trends of opinions under agents exposition to
the media broadcasting at different tolerance levels. At each turn, the central
media deliver the same message, with the matters values respectively set to
0.8 for security and 0.3 for welfare.
As one can see in the first chart of Figure 1.5, showing the trend of agents
opinions on security and welfare for increasing exposition to media when the
tolerance is fixed to 0.1, the media affect the opinion of agents also at low levels
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of tolerance but with a lower impact. Notice that when the media broadcasting
reaches all the agents (MB= 100%), the values for security and welfare get
closer to the values they have in absence of centralized media.
When tolerance is low - meaning that agent are less inclined to accept
others information as reliable - P2P inhibits at least partially the effect of
media. However, results show an interesting effect of non-linearity. As shown
in the second chart, when tolerance is fixed to 0.5 and broadcasting is above
70% (i.e. a strong majority of agents are reached by central media), the infor-
mational cheating is amplified by the P2P communication, clearly affecting
the agents perceptions and driving their opinions toward the values reported
on by the media.
However, when boradcasting is below 70% at the same level of tolerance
(0.5), Peer-to-Peer communication reduces the effect of informational cheat-
ing, allowing for more realistic information to spread. When agents are nei-
ther totally prone to accept others information nor completely refractory to it,
P2P communication inhibits at least partially the broadcasting informational
cheating.
Tolerance at 0.5 balances informational cheating until broadcasting reaches
the 40% of the population. Instead, when tolerance is set to 0.8 (third chart of
Figure 1.5), the process is linear: the average opinions on security and welfare
increasingly approximate the values reported on by the media, depending on
the values of broadcasting. The higher the tolerance, the poorer the informa-
tion quality: agents find no shelter against informational cheating.
1.6.3 Scenario 3: Media and Experts
The third set of scenarios aims at exploring the consequences of different
percentages of agents exposed to the main streams of information. Hence, each
scenario is characterized by an increasing degree of exposure to conventional
media and by a decreasing number of experts.
As one can see from the experimental settings listed in details in Table
1.1, the population is composed by 100 agents (NA) endowed with the abil-
ity to process the information through a variable level of confidence (TOL).
A subset of agents (WAs) can access a different source of information with
values different from the ones reported on by the media (TVs). Each scenario
has been simulated in ten runs. In short these experiments are aimed at un-
derstanding the mutual effects of different information (with complementary
values) delivered by different agencies.
Emerging Results
The results emerging from the first battery of experiments are shown in Fig-
ure 1.6 where the aggregate values of both agents’ opinions on security and
welfare matters, for increasing presence of WAs, are reported. The figures
report the opinion trends for different levels of tolerance (0.2, 0.5, 0.8).
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Table 1.1. Experiments Settings
NA MB WAs TOL
100 0 100 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 10 90 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 20 80 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 30 70 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 40 60 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 50 50 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 60 40 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 70 30 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 80 20 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 90 10 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 100 0 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
All figures show the same effect: the higher the presence of WAs the more
the agents’ opinions converge toward the values reported on by the experts
(3 for security and 8 for welfare). On the contrary, namely when the media
reach the largest amount of the total population (and WAs are on the lowest
level), no convergence can be observed but only the reduction of the distances
among values. In our view this phenomenon indicates that, consistent with
our previous results, the efficacy of traditional media are sensitive to the
effect of peer-to-peer communication. By definition WAs do not process the
information with the bounded confidence mechanism, thus the tolerance does
not affect opinion adjustment.
Notice the extent to which the opinion trend passes the line of the average
value (i.e. 0.5). The WAs effect is relevant when the global tolerance is fixed
to 2: the 30% of WAs is sufficient to invert the effect on mass opinions of
the 70% of TWs. Furthermore when tolerance is higher (5), the number of
WAs needed to inhibit media is smaller (20%). One may expect that toler-
ance plays a fundamental role in opinions’ convergence toward the media or
the WAs values. Results indicate that the high level of confidence in buying
others’ information has a side effect: WAs are less efficient when tolerance is
high, meaning that if uncertainty is strong agents are inclined to accept any
information as truthful, even that provided by the media.
1.6.4 Scenario 4: Media, Internet and Uninformed Agents
The last scenario is similar to the one described in the previous section, except
for the different distribution of WAs and TVs. In the preceding experiment
the total amount of the population is either reached by the media, or resorts
to experts. Peer-to-peer communication inhibits the spreading of information
from the media, but what would happen if a given percentage of agents is
reached neither by the media nor by the experts? In other words, let us assume
that in the scenarios characterized by an increase of TVs (and consequently
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(a) Tolerance: 0.2 (b) Tolerance: 0.5
(c) Tolerance: 0.8
Fig. 1.6. Opinion Trend under Peer Pressure without Black Zone
by a decrease of WAs), a 30% of the agents, that we call the white zone, use
only the information circulating in the neighborhood as their main source of
information.
As one can see from the experimental settings listed in details in Table
1.2, the population is composed by 100 agents (NA) endowed with the ability
to process the information through a variable level of confidence (TOL). A
subset of agents (WAs) can access a different source of information with values
different from the ones reported on by the media (TVs). This battery of
experiments aims at understanding the effect of the two sources of information
also on agents that are never directly reached by them. In particular the agents
lying in the white zone will receive the information delivered either by experts
and media but only through their neighbors. Such a process of information
transmission propagates information through all the interaction topology: a
message delivered by an agent will get far away on the network.
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Each scenario has been simulated in ten runs.
Table 1.2. Experiments Settings
NA MB WAs T
100 0 70 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 10 60 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 20 50 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 30 40 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 40 30 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 50 20 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 60 10 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 70 0 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
Emerging Results
The results emerging from this set of experiments are shown in Figure 1.7,
where the aggregate values of agents’ opinions with respect to welfare and
security are reported for the various different scenarios, each one denoted by
an increasing number of WAs and a decreasing number of TVs. The figures
reported on the different scenarios stand for different values of tolerance (0.2,
0.5, 0.8). Remember that tolerance is the threshold representing the limit
within which an information can be taken into account by the agents or not.
Hence the higher the tolerance the more likely the agents will be to trust
informers. As derived from our hypotheses, the white zone matters. Looking
at the initial portion of each box in Figure 1.7, in which all agents are TVs
(and WAs are absents), the average values for security and welfare are never
the same as the messages spread by the media.
There is a clear evidence of the capacity of peer-to-peer communication
to inhibit the effect played by the central media. Furthermore, this evidence
is amplified by the white zone (i.e. the 30% of agents not directly reached by
the media nor by the experts). Looking at the pictures shown in Figure 1.6,
the distance between the initial values of opinions and the media’s message is
smaller than the same distance in the second scenario. Looking at the pictures
reproduced in Figure 1.6, the distance between the initial values of opinions
and the media’s message is smaller than the same distance in the second
scenario. Even when TVs are predominant, the central media do not lead to
opinions converging on the values they transmit.
1.7 Conclusions
In this paper, the dynamics of two relatively independent opinions in a simu-
lated network is observed. Plunged into the network, agents characterized as
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(a) Tolerance: 0.2 (b) Tolerance: 0.5
(c) Tolerance: 0.8
Fig. 1.7. Opinion Trends with the 30% of agents being not reached by media and
experts
more or less likely to exchange opinions with neighbors are also exposed to
information broadcasted by central media.
A first series of experiments shows that when central media spread false
news, P2P communication can reduce the effect of informational cheating until
the broadcasting message has reached around half the population, but it tends
to lose this compensating effect for increasing values of agents’ exposure to
informational cheating. Even a small number of experts can dramatically re-
orient agents’ opinions. This effect is less flashy when agents are more likely to
accept others’ opinions, what should not come as a surprise: the less confident
agents are, the more they tend to oscillate among different opinions. Instead,
the more confident they are, the lesser they are likely to converge on either the
experts’ or anyone else opinions. However, with a mild level of confidence the
expert source is more efficacious in contrasting the impact of informational
cheating.
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A second series of experiments shows the effect of peer-to-peer communi-
cation. When a certain percentage of the population is not directly reached
neither by the media nor by the experts, the agents’ opinions do not totally
converge on the messages spread by the media, not even for the highest num-
ber of agents exposed to the media and the lowest number of agents’ accessing
the experts.
The results obtained so far provide some tentative answers to our initial
questions. What is the impact of P2P communication on information quality,
when agents are exposed to central media information flooding? It depends on
how pervasive the broadcasting is: peer-to-peer communication can contrast
the impact of the complementary system until when no more than 60% of the
population is reached by the broadcasted messages. How much experts must
be accessed through the P2P system for contrasting informational cheating?
It depends on agents’ confidence in their own opinions: when this is too high
or too low, a larger number of experts (30% or more) is needed to contrast
informational cheating. When confidence is neither too high nor too low, even
a small percentage (around 20% ) is enough to obtain the same results.
Is peer-to-peer communication able to inhibit the information flooding ex-
ercised by the central media, inhibiting possible information cheating and con-
taining the corruption of information? Our simulation provides a preliminary
positive answer to this question. A white zone, in which there are no teleview-
ers nor wise agents and in which agents can access information only through
their neighbors, prevents opinions from converging on the values transmitted
through the central media. Peer-to-peer communication matters in reducing
aggregation of opinions.
As several recent research works have outlined out the importance of the
dynamic aspects of social interactions [35, 17, 4, 5, 26, 27, 6, 34], in future
studies we are interested to characterise the opinions’ evolution and how their
behavior is affected by the dynamic nature of contacts. In addition, we aim at
implementing a more plausible model of opinions, taking into account other
dimensions beside confidence, in particular the perceived correspondence be-
tween own and others’ opinions and how these dimensions interact in the
dynamics of beliefs.
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